This article presents a model of the important health-policy dilemmas of risk selection and moral hazard. When providers can increase revenues by selecting favorable risks, capitation or purely prospective payment is unlikely to be optimal. A second best payment system may involve mixed levels of both demand-and supply-side cost sharing: consumers may prefer to pay deductibles and co-payments rather than to have their healthcare providers receive large financial rewards for skimping on care or discriminating against expensive-to-treat patients. Risk adjustment can improve the terms of the social trade-off between inefficient utilization and inequitable coverage. The role of professional ethics is also considered.
INTRODUCTION
It has been recognized for a long time that how we pay healthcare providers and how we insure consumers against the risks of medical expenditures-that is, how we design health insurance-provider payment systems-can have significant consequences for the equity and efficiency of a healthcare system. Health insurance creates a problem of moral hazard: fully insured consumers tend to overuse services that appear to be "free" or are heavily subsidized. Demand-side cost sharing (e.g., deductibles and co-insurance), often used to discourage this over-utilization, compromise the purpose of insurance by making the consumer pay unpredictable, nontrivial co-payments. Alternatively, providers can be given financial incentives to restrict care. Since providers have considerable influence over treatment decisions, supply-side cost sharing can be a powerful instrument for controlling healthcare costs. Along with the good incentives to curb wasteful over-utilization, however, are bundled perverse incentives to deny beneficial but costly services and to shun the sickest patients (risk selection). Part of the recent backlash against managed care in the United States stems from consumer discontent with such potentially quality-damaging costcontrol measures. 1 This article develops a simple model to illustrate the incentive trade-offs associated with the dual "market failures" of moral hazard and risk selection. Previous theoretical results on optimal payment systems emerge as the special case of our model when there is no consumer heterogeneity. The model suggests that when providers can increase revenues by selecting favorable risks, demand-and supply-side cost sharing 2 can no longer in general achieve the social optimum. The "second best" optimal payment system may involve mixed levels of both demand-and supply-side cost sharing. Purely prospective or capitation payment is unlikely to be optimal. The results underscore the fact that policymakers seeking cost containment, patient choice, and universal access must attend to selection incentives when designing or reforming healthcare systems.
The article is organized as follows. The first section gives an overview of the policy significance of risk selection. The next section presents the model. Then, the article focuses on how the presence of risk selection alters previously derived results on optimal payment systems. A simple extension to risk adjustment of provider payments is presented in the fourth section. The following section puts the model in the context of previous theoretical work. The conclusion discusses limitations and other potential extensions.
THE POLICY IMPORTANCE OF RISK SELECTION
A healthcare provider-insurer or health plan has a financial interest in trying to enroll consumers at low risk for treatment and to discourage high-risk consumers from enrolling. Such behavior is called risk selection. Newhouse (1996) defines selection as "actions of economic agents on either side of the market to exploit unpriced risk heterogeneity and break pooling arrangements, with the result that some consumers may not obtain the insurance they desire" (p. 1236).
3 Selection leads to inefficiency as well as inequity 4 because it defeats risk pooling and prevents individuals from being able to buy insurance against becoming a bad risk in the future or having a child who is a bad risk (ibid., p. 1241).
In most contexts, health plans are proscribed from explicitly denying coverage to a consumer based on health status (e.g., pre-existing condition clauses). Purchasers frequently stipulate standard benefit packages to prevent plans from openly manipulating benefit design to select against high risks. Yet health plans may engage in many other kinds of risk selection, such as selective marketing, distortion of the quality of services, location of health facilities in profitable areas (see, e.g., Norton and Staiger, 1994) , and staffing and infrastructure decisions. These more indirect forms are difficult to regulate; they are the focus in this article's model of the three-way trade-off between risk selection, moral hazard, and risk spreading.
That selection is an important and increasingly recognized policy problem is evident from the experience of many social insurance programs, such as Medicare and Medicaid in the United States. Under Medicare, the government has paid managed care organizations (MCOs) such as health maintenance organizations (HMOs) an amount per enrolled Medicare beneficiary less than what average patients would be expected to spend under traditional fee-for-service. Yet MCOs have managed to attract a relatively healthier population. 5 The government has been left to cover the costs of an adverse selection of higher risk patients in fee-for-service (FFS) Medicare. This risk selection has resulted in approximately $2 billion in excess payments to MCOs (Physician Payment Review Commission, 1996 .
Another example comes from the dilemma facing many Medicaid managed care programs. Some expensive patient groups, such as people living with HIV/AIDS, tend to enroll disproportionately in specific health plans that provide appropriate services for their needs. In Oregon, for example, most MCOs have few AIDS patients, yet one MCO has a rate of HIV/AIDS patients nearly four times the statewide average (Conviser et al., 1998, p. 67) . This is highly problematic for plans paid a capitation rate not adjusted for health status, because the average payment of several thousand dollars is only a fraction of the cost of treating a patient with AIDS. Plans that do not effectively risk-select against such expensive patients are financially penalized and might eventually go bankrupt, compromising access and quality of care for the neediest patients.
In addition to government-run social insurance programs, other healthcare purchasers ("sponsors") such as employers and purchasing cooperatives often confront riskselection problems. The experience of the Group Insurance Commission (GIC) of Massachusetts, one of the largest healthcare purchasers in New England, is illustrative. Aware for a long time of the problems of inequitable access and unfair payments that selection causes, GIC administrators imposed strict benefit regulation on the multiple plans that contract to care for GIC beneficiaries. Nevertheless, analysis based on sophisticated risk assessment of patient diagnoses for all plans revealed that the FFS-based indemnity plan had predicted costs 20 to 30 percent above average, whereas the average cost of seven HMOs was about 20 percent below the grand average (Ash et al., 1998) . In light of this evidence, the GIC is now considering implementing risk adjustment-a commonly proposed solution to the problem of selection. 5 Hill and Brown (1990) studied choices of U.S. Medicare beneficiaries who were offered the option of enrolling in an HMO or remaining in traditional fee-for-service Medicare. They found that in the year before the choice, those who subsequently chose the HMO spent 23 percent less than the others, after adjusting for differences with respect to age, sex, welfare status, institutional status, and location. In addition, adjusted mortality rates for the year following the choice were on average 25 percent lower among enrollees in the studied HMOs than their comparison groups. "Although better care in HMOs could account for this result, such an explanation seems much less probable than that healthier individuals chose the HMO option" (Newhouse, 1996 (Newhouse, , p. 1254 ).
Risk adjustment involves adjusting payments to providers to reflect the expected cost of treating a given patient or group of patients. The provider will not have incentive to avoid costly patients if paid the expected cost of those patients. 6 The United States Government has sponsored extensive research into developing diagnosis-based risk adjustment techniques and will be implementing risk adjustment in the Medicare program beginning in 2000. Several Medicaid programs, state governments, and employer groups have already adopted forms of risk adjustment. During the 1990s, risk adjustment was implemented in at least 10 other countries as well (Van de Ven and Ellis, 1999) .
Risk adjustment holds the promise of making selection unprofitable, thus allowing choice without inducing inefficient market sorting. Therefore, accurate risk adjustment is critical for a payment system to promote choice, efficiency, and quality healthcare. Unfortunately, risk adjustment is not widely used, and techniques developed to date are not necessarily capable of adjusting payments as well as plans may be able to risk-select. State-of-the-art risk adjustment techniques can predict only a fraction of the 20-25 percent of variance in individual health spending that an ideal risk adjuster would predict .
In the absence of accurate and feasible risk adjustment, cost-sharing arrangements are key policy instruments for managing selection. Attention must be paid to how demand-side and supply-side incentives interact in payment systems. 7 The health economics literature, however, has not fully integrated selection into models of optimal payment systems. The focus has been on moral hazard, with the level of demand-side cost sharing (patient out-of-pocket payments) being a single policy tool aiming at two conflicting goals: minimization of consumer risk from medical expenditures and control of moral hazard (Zeckhauser, 1970) . Newhouse (1996) highlights the supply-side trade-off between giving incentives for efficiency in production versus selection. In this article, an attempt is made to integrate these insights by developing a simple model of moral hazard, risk spreading, and risk selection.
The results are policy relevant for their theoretical justification for systems of mixed demand-and supply-side cost sharing. In Ellis and McGuire's 1990 model of optimal payment systems, a mixed level of both demand-and supply-side cost sharing is never an optimal payment system for risk-averse consumers. Yet such mixed systems are increasingly prevalent in reality. Consumer out-of-pocket spending usually accounts for a small but nontrivial percentage of a nation's total health expenditures (e.g., 11 percent in Germany, 3 percent in the U.K., and 17 percent in the U.S., according to OECD health data), while supply-side cost sharing through capitation and case-based payment is used or is being introduced in most industrialized countries. Transitional economies are also widely adopting this mixed incentive system. Why does observed policy diverge so much from the theoretical optimum of the Ellis and McGuire model? This puzzle can be explained by deficiencies in the theory, particu-6 Expected cost is estimated based on observable characteristics of patients that are correlated with healthcare use (called risk adjusters), such as age, gender, and diagnoses. 7 For example, HMOs often require only minimal demand-side cost sharing, with patient copayments significantly lower than under FFS plans. Low co-payments should attract high users (e.g., the chronically ill). The fact that HMOs usually enroll healthier consumers than do FFS plans is therefore further evidence that HMOs select against high risks to some extent.
larly the absence of consumer heterogeneity and provider risk selection. This article shows that this common mixed-payment system can indeed emerge as an optimal "second-best" strategy in the "more realistic" world of risk heterogeneity and selection behavior by providers.
THE MODEL
This article develops a simple model of risk selection, moral hazard, and risk spreading. It uses the Ellis and McGuire (1990) optimal payment system framework but relaxes their assumption of consumer homogeneity.
The Players and Timing
Three basic kinds of players exist in the model: consumers, a regulator/payer who maximizes consumer welfare, and a healthcare provider. The payer could be any sponsor, such as the government or an employer. For simplicity, the single supply-side economic agent is assumed to represent a MCO. "Provider" is intentionally ambiguous, meant to cover both a FFS physician group and a capitated MCO, because the extent to which the provider bears risk-acts as insurer-is endogenous. The model abstracts from other organizational distinctions on the supply side.
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Assume that consumers are identical except for the probability of becoming ill. There are two classes of risk. High risks have a probability of illness δ H greater than that of low risks: δ δ
H L
> . Consumers know their own risk type, but this is private information. The proportion of high risks in the population, µ , is common knowledge. The total population is normalized to 1. Average population risk is therefore
Assume that X units of curative medical services can be provided at a unit cost of 1. When ill, the consumer experiences a utility loss of magnitude K -B(X). Consumption of health services yields benefits B X K ( ) ≤ , increasing and concave in X.
The timing of the model is as follows. Nature determines individual risk types. The payer sets the payment system. 9 Then the MCO invests in risk selection. Consumers enroll in the MCO, with some self-selecting to be uninsured if the MCO risk-selects against them. The payer collects premiums from insured consumers and makes capitation payments to the provider. Nature then decides whether each consumer remains healthy or becomes ill, according to individual risk probability. Patients and provider agree on treatment, and then patient co-payments and provider reimbursements (if any) are made.
Provider Incentives and Selection
The provider maximizes total utility from treatment of a pool of enrollees. Behavior is shaped by two factors: the incentives of the payment system and the provider's propensity to respond to those incentives, as colored by professional ethics. Providers, acting as agents for patient principals, are in a position to counsel patients regarding what services are necessary (Arrow, 1963; McGuire, 1999) . 10 One of the strengths of the model developed by Ellis and McGuire (1986, 1990 ) is the tractable conceptualization of provider agency. Assume that the provider derives utility per patient from net revenues π( ) X and patient benefits B X ( ), with a constant subjective marginal rate of substitution. Provider utility per patient is then
The agency parameter α represents the extent to which the provider takes on the patient's objectives (for treatment benefits) as his or her own. When α = 0 , the provider ignores patient benefits. (When α = ∞ the provider focuses exclusively on patient benefits, ignoring net revenue). Higher agency α represents greater fidelity to patient interests at the expense of financial rewards. When α = 1, the provider gives equal weight to net revenues and patient benefits.
The extent of provider agency on behalf of patients therefore can span a continuum from pure profit maximization α = ( ) 0 to "super" agency α > ( ) 1 . Since "the Hippocratic Oath does not extend to conserving society's resources" (Cutler and Zeckhauser, 1999, p. 31) , "super" agency is "too much of a good thing," leading to indulgence of moral hazard and inefficiency. In much of the policy debate, however, the primary concern is the opposite-that pursuit of profits may overshadow professional ethics; i.e., α < 1. We will refer to this case as "imperfect agency."
Assume that the regulator pays the provider a capitation payment R per enrollee irrespective of utilization and reimburses ( ) 1 − s per unit of treatment. The provider 10 In this role, physicians are called on to serve the interests of "two masters"-to be the agent for two principals-the patient and the MCO (see note 6). Physician "double agency" is one example of what is more generally termed "common agency" in principal-agent theory, a case in which an agent is "used in common" by two or more principals. Physician agency, however, calls for a slightly different modeling approach since the provider is not technically paid simultaneously by both principals. The patient-physician "payment" is through reputational effects and internalization of agency on behalf of consumers as a part of the provider's own preferences, rather than through an incentive scheme imposed by a patient-"principal" on top of that imposed by the MCO-"principal." If the MCO were a perfect agent for the patient, of course, there would be no divergence between the two "principals" of the physician.
is not reimbursed for the share of costs s per service, so s represents the degree of supply-side cost sharing. Ellis and McGuire (1990) (E&M) assume 0 1 ≤ ≤ s , with cost-based reimbursement represented by R = 0, s = 0, and fully prospective payment denoted by R > 0, s = 1. In the present model, the constraint on s is relaxed to include fee-for-service payment: − ≤ ≤ m s 1, where m denotes the profit margin per service.
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Previous models of selection have assumed that risk selection against unprofitable consumers is costless and perfect (Ma, 1994; Ellis, 1997) . Although this might serve as a useful benchmark, a more convincing model would allow selection effort to be costly and imperfect, leading to some risk pooling in integrated health plans (Newhouse 1996) . The author simplifies by assuming that selection affects the expected utility of high risks but not of low risks.
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Assume that if the MCO exerts effort t to select favorable risks, a high risk with probability t will self-select out of the MCO. In other words, a proportion t of highrisk consumers finds it not utility-maximizing to seek to enroll in an MCO that exerts selection effort t. These high risks are said to be "dumped" from the MCO.
13 By assumption, these consumers are uninsured but treated when ill by a backstop provider with lower amenities if not lower technical quality of care (e.g., public hospitals). The welfare loss from selection is captured rather starkly as a normalization of uninsured utility to zero. Risk selection t is assumed to be noncontractible. It can be thought of as representing the "residual" and more insidious forms of risk selection that are not effectively prevented by the current payment classification and regulatory framework.
In a more complicated model, the unattractiveness to high risks of a risk-selecting MCO should be explicitly modeled as a service distortion affecting both high and low risks, albeit differentially, or the result of selective advertising, with explicitly asymmetric information between consumers and MCOs. Yet the author's theoretical 14 In this model, t represents the probability that a high risk will self-select out of an MCO that invests t in selection. One example of such a 0 1 − index, described in the appendix, is a measure of the extent of deviation of service-specific shadow prices from optimal values. 15 The resource costs of selection could include the managerial effort and ingenuity required to implement selection subtly and effectively. They may also represent the costs of convincing or inducing physicians-who might find selection professionally repugnant-to join a riskselecting MCO and to conform with practices that select favorable risks, such as being rude to patients who are unprofitable in hopes they will disenroll. 16 Perfect selection will never be observed if its marginal cost exceeds the marginal benefit of perfect information, which may be substantially less than infinity. Nevertheless, this assumption is a convenient simplification. In sum, the assumptions on the technology of
simplification brings certain virtues: (1) representing the broad range of provider selection behavior with a simple 0-1 index 14 ; (2) incorporating selection effects not only from benefit design and service-specific quality distortions, but also from selective advertising, etc.; (3) achieving relative tractability; and (4) capturing the fact that selection behavior is costly for providers (even in the absence of discipline from competitive markets). A fuller treatment of these issues awaits further research.
Assume that selection effort t has a utility cost for the provider of γ ( ) t , increasing and convex in selection effort. This may represent ethical distaste for selection.
15 Perfect selection-dumping all high risks-is represented by t = 1. Assume that perfect selection is impossible since it would be too costly to obtain ′ = = ∞ γ ( ) t 1 .
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There is at least anecdotal evidence that health providers do exert costly effort to risk-select. For example, when a large purchasing cooperative in California implemented risk adjustment, policymakers found that "carriers realized that they would be penalized (through risk adjustment) if they engaged in some of the more subtle forms of risk selection. One carrier representative commented. . .that all the effort involved in recontracting to avoid use of academic medical centers likely would result in making her plan a payor plan, because of lower incidence of serious diagnoses" (Bertko and Hunt, 1998, p. 150) . The Minneapolis Buyers Healthcare Action Group also found that after instituting risk adjustment, "care system managers were talking about reduced concern with. . .selection and even the desire to attract enrollees with chronic illnesses" (Knutson, 1998, p. 176) .
When providers engage in risk selection, the expected utility of high-risk consumers is a decreasing function of the probability that they will be "dumped":
If the entire population N = ( ) 1 would have enrolled in the MCO in the absence of selection, then when selection effort t is exerted, the actual enrollment is N t ( ):
Given selection effort t , the risk mix enrolled in the MCO-the probability of falling ill for the average enrollee-is δ( ) t :
When there is no risk selection ( = ) t 0 , the enrollee average risk is the population average, δ . If risk selection were perfect t = ( ) 1 , the enrollees would be only low risks:
Enrollee morbidity risk (and thus expected cost) decreases with selection:
Note that when the population is homogeneous (
, the numerator of (7) is zero and enrollee morbidity risk is unaffected by selection. Indeed, in this special case-the one modeled by Ellis and McGuire, 1990 -selection could never arise.
Under the chosen payment system, the FFS component of a provider's total revenues will depend on how often enrollees become ill and seek care. Therefore, when providers are not fully prepaid and at least part of provider payment is utilizationbased s < ( ) 1 , the total amount of reimbursement will depend on the average morbidity risk of enrolled consumers:
Expected net revenue per enrollee is given by provider reimbursement (8) less the expected costs of treatment δ(
Utility per enrollee is composed of the fixed payment R plus the expected benefits and costs of treating patients when ill, a function of the average morbidity risk of the enrolled population. Utility from treating an ill patient is the utility gain a provider feels from acting as an agent for the patient (measured in monetary units), less the share of treatment costs not reimbursed by the payer. Total provider utility is utility per enrollee times the number of enrollees, less the cost of risk-selection effort:
By assumption, this objective function is strictly concave in t, so that the first order condition defines the provider's optimal choice of selection effort, t * :
( 1 1 ) This first order condition shows that the provider risk-selects t* > ( ) 0 if and only if the marginal benefit of risk selection-the left side of (11)-is greater than the marginal cost of effort ′( ) γ t . For each dumped high risk, the provider gains the avoided expected costs of treatment, net of expected agency utility and the capitation payment. The provider invests in selection effort up to the point at which its marginal utility cost-the right side of (11)-equals its marginal benefit. Marginal selection benefit is increasing in the proportion of high risks in the population, the morbidity risk of high-risk consumers, and the amount of supply-side cost sharing. The marginal benefit of selection is decreasing in agency and the level of capitation payment.
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Note that if supply-side cost sharing is less than or equal to zero-corresponding to FFS or cost-based reimbursement-then the marginal "benefit" of selection is always negative, indicating that the provider would never choose a positive level of risk selection under these payment systems. This underscores why selection has become an increasingly important policy dilemma as unregulated FFS is supplanted by managed care and supply-side financial incentives for cost control.
Consumer Expected Utility
An individual consumer is assumed to have an expected utility that is state dependent. As in E&M (1990) , consumer utility when healthy depends on consumption of a single nonhealthcare good that yields a constant marginal utility, η . The price of the nonhealthcare good is normalized to one. Therefore, with Y income and P the premium paid for health insurance, the consumer can purchase Y -P units. As a result, utility when healthy is η(Y ± P).
When ill and seeking medical care, a patient experiences a loss of utility from paying co-payments. The magnitude of this loss is determined by the co-insurance rate,
), and the marginal utility of income when ill, λ . Given risk aversion, marginal utility of income is higher when ill than when healthy: λ η > . A convenient normalization is to set the expected marginal utility of income for a high-risk consumer equal to one:
With this normalization, risk aversion is represented by λ > 1. Denote a low-risk consumer's expected marginal utility of income as ρ :
When consumers are risk-averse λ > ( ) 1 , the expected marginal utility of income of a low-risk individual p ( ) is less than 1 (because he or she expects to be healthy-the state of lower marginal utility of income-more often than a high risk would be). All consumers would like to insure ex ante against being a high-risk person, but there is a missing market for such insurance. 17 If the capitation payment R is sufficiently generous (e.g., exceeding the expected cost of the highest-risk consumer), then risk selection will not be profitable. However, if financing provider rents causes an efficiency loss, then preventing the inefficiency of selection by paying providers generously causes an offsetting deadweight loss from taxation.
A consumer's expected utility is composed of two parts: the expected utility from consumption of the nonhealthcare good when healthy and the expected utility of consumption of both healthcare and the other good when ill:
Substituting (12) and (13) into (14), the expected utility of high-and low-risk consumers can be written respectively as
Y-P (multiplied by ρ for low risks) represents the expected utility from nonhealthcare consumption. ] is determined by bargaining between patient and provider. This bargaining can be thought of as a simple formalization of the much more subtle process of interaction between patient and provider through which the insured patient's desire for services is brought into line with the provider's recommendation.
For simplicity, the focus is on the case of equal bargaining power between patient and provider. Following E&M (1990) Proposition 1, the level of services is given by the average of the quantity desired by the patient and the quantity recommended by the physician, which are the result of patient and provider maximization of utility with respect to treatment level X: 
Consumer demand is decreasing in demand-side cost sharing. Provider-recommended utilization is decreasing in supply-side cost sharing, taking extreme values in the implausible case of a pure profit maximizer α = ( ) 0 . By allowing supply-side cost sharing to be negative, the model can capture the full gamut of provider behavior posited in the literature, from over-provision beyond indulgence of moral hazard (when s < 0 ) to under-provision (for high s ) and anything in between. The larger the degree of agency on behalf of the patient α ( ), the smaller the incentive to overrecommend services under FFS ("supplier-induced demand") and to under-recommend services under prospective payment or capitation.
Expected Social Welfare
In this simple model, the regulator/payer has four policy instruments or choice variables with which to maximize social welfare: demand-and supply-side cost sharing ( θ and s ), the premium P charged consumers, and the lump-sum payment R for providers. The author simplifies by focusing on the choice of demand-and supplyside cost sharing, given assumptions about how P and R are determined based on cost sharing.
The payer pays the provider according to (8) and collects co-payments from patients. The payer charges enrolled consumers a premium, based on pooled population risk δ and expected utilization X , 18 that allows the payer to break even:
To focus on risk selection and abstract from adverse selection, assume that consumers are sufficiently risk-averse so that in the absence of selection distortions t = ( ) 0 , all consumers would prefer to buy insurance at the break-even premium P rather than be uninsured. In particular, low risks are assumed to prefer to buy insurance even though their only potential insurance purchase involves cross-subsidizing high risks. This ensures that the participation constraint for low-risk consumers is fulfilled.
The regulator sets R so that provider net revenue would be zero in the absence of selection:
To capture the idea that high provider profits may have important efficiency as well as distributional effects, provider (extra-normal) profits from selection are presumed to be financed with revenues raised through distortionary taxation (Laffont and Tirole, 1993) . 19 The deadweight loss per dollar of tax revenue is τ > 0, so that the welfare loss from financing provider rents is τπ per insured consumer. 18 The model incorporates the simplifying assumption that the planner can fully anticipate the level of health-service utilization that a patient and provider will agree on, perhaps through knowledge of past utilization. 19 For simplicity, it is assumed that the premium (or pure capitation break-even payment to providers) does not incur a deadweight efficiency loss because it is financed from voluntary consumer insurance payments, not from government tax revenues. This can be justified by the relatively low tax rate on premiums compared to profits under most systems (e.g., the U.S. tax subsidy to employer-provided health insurance).
Consider a utilitarian definition of social welfare in which expected welfare is simply the sum of consumer expected utility (including the efficiency loss from financing provider rents through distortionary taxation). Then maximizing social welfare is essentially equivalent to maximizing the expected utility of a randomly chosen consumer, subject to the constraint that providers are willing to provide services and low risks are willing to participate. The preceding assumptions ensure that these two constraints are fulfilled.
Substituting in (4), (15), and (16), we find
The Social Optimum
In the socially preferred or "first-best" scenario, utilization of healthcare services would be set so that marginal benefit equals marginal cost:
In addition, demand-side cost sharing would be zero to achieve efficient risk spreading (i.e., full insurance for risk-averse consumers): θ FB = 0 . Selection would be zero to achieve full insurance for all (risk-averse) consumers, including all high risks: t FB = 0 . And provider net revenue would be zero to avoid the deadweight loss from financing provider rents: π FB = 0. The socially optimal level of expected welfare is
OPTIMAL PAYMENT SYSTEMS IN THE PRESENCE OF RISK SELECTION
Several intuitive policy conclusions emerge from this simple model of payment systems that trade off risk spreading, moral hazard, and selection. Although the specific values of demand-and supply-side cost sharing will depend on the choice of social welfare function, some general results apply to a broad range of social objectives that put sufficient weight on the expected utility of a randomly chosen consumer. E&M (1990) ].
When selection is an option for providers, however, the optimal payment system diverges from that in a world of consumer homogeneity. This result implies that supply-side cost sharing is not as effective a policy instrument as previous models suggest. Use of supply-side cost sharing solves the moral hazard problem only if providers are sufficiently poor agents for consumers, yet poor provider agency for patients is precisely the circumstance under which a second important problem arises-that of risk selection.
A related and important difference from the no-selection model is that fully prospective payment is less likely to be optimal. In E&M (1990), if there were a significant amount of moral hazard, supply-side cost sharing was optimally set at its maximum (s=1). The assumption was that raising supply-side cost sharing entailed virtually no social costs. This article introduces a realistic cost of increasing supply-side cost sharing: putting the provider at risk may induce large amounts of effort to be expended on socially wasteful risk selection. As the degree of supply-side cost sharing increases, the selection effort exerted by a low-agency provider increases (at a decreasing rate because of increasing marginal effort costs of selection-see Table 1 ). For a pure profit maximizer, Since selection represents welfare loss for society, this illustrates a potentially important disadvantage of using pure capitation (or fully prospective) payment as a cost containment strategy. In E&M (1990) , purely prospective payment is optimal whenever the moral hazard problem is severe enough; in this model, purely prospective payment could be optimal only if moral hazard is not only severe enough but also the welfare loss from selection induced by high supply-side cost sharing does not outweigh the benefit of reducing moral hazard through supply-instead of demandside incentives. It is in this sense that fully prospective payment is less likely to be optimal. This result supports the insight of Newhouse (1996) even in the absence of a selection-versus-production-efficiency trade-off.
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The following logic points to the optimality of a mixed provider payment system 0 1 < < ( ) s . When the reimbursement system is changed from pure capitation to a mixed system, incentives for selection decline. Assume sufficient population risk heterogeneity and nonprohibitive costs of selection so that some dumping occurred under pure capitation. Then a welfare improvement will occur from fewer high risks being dumped when payment becomes less than fully prospective. The cost of reducing supply-side cost sharing is less provider constraint on over-utilization (or, if there was underprovision with pure capitation, a welfare gain from less under-servicing). 22 When risk heterogeneity and the welfare loss from dumping are large enough, the welfare gain from less selection outweighs the cost, and movement toward a mixed payment system is welfare improving.
A third result is that whereas in E&M (1990) the commonly used payment system of mixed supply-and demand-side cost sharing ( 0 1 < < s and 0 1 < < θ ) is never optimal for risk-averse consumers, it can be optimal in the presence of selection. Raising supply-side cost sharing to combat the moral hazard induced by full insurance may result in more welfare loss from selection than welfare gain from reduced moral hazard. Therefore, it may be optimal to impose some demand-side cost sharing to constrain over-utilization rather than raise s. This result is quite intuitive. Consumers might prefer paying small out-of-pocket payments rather than having providers financially constrained to skimp on care or to discriminate against expensive-to-treat patients.
Another intuitive result of the selection-augmented model is that provider professional ethics, specifically in the form of fidelity to patient interests, can be beneficial for moderating adverse side effects of powerful supply-side financial incentives. In a hypothetical world in which the only problem is moral hazard, taking into account patient desires is socially counterproductive because a good agent tends to indulge the insured patient's desire for "all the technology that money can buy"; agency merely 21 The trade-off between selection and efficiency in production can be captured in this model through cost-reducing effort e that reduces unit treatment cost to c e ( ) < 1 at effort cost γ ( ) e t + . In that case, selection and cost reduction are substitutes (de*/dt*<0). 22 Another cost of reducing supply-side cost sharing may be reduced incentive for efficiency in production.
blunts the policy instrument of supply-side cost sharing [E&M (1990) ]. When, in contrast, moral hazard is not the only inefficiency that a payment system must address, provider fidelity to patient interests (agency) can be beneficial. It can reduce or prevent supplier-induced demand at one extreme (low s ) and under-utilization and risk selection at the other (high s ). As can be seen from the first order condition for selection (11), a higher agency parameter decreases the marginal benefit from selection. Although ethical providers might not be highly concerned about lack of treatment for consumers who are not enrolled in their plan, they might be professionally repulsed by risk selection that involves skimping on care for high-cost patients to encourage disenrollment. It is in this sense that promoting professional ethics to reinforce provider agency for patients can be seen as one effective policy instrument for moving toward the socially preferred outcome.
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In E&M (1990), low provider agency for patients worked in conjunction with high provider bargaining power vis-à-vis patients to allow attainment of socially preferred ("first-best") outcomes for the moral hazard problem. 24 However, as this model points out, low agency and high provider bargaining power (by analogous argument) are precisely the conditions under which the welfare losses from risk selection can be most severe. Modeling consumer heterogeneity and the problem of risk selection therefore confirm the wisdom of policy proposals that instead promote a patientcentered healthcare system that gives patients adequate information to make informed choices and that aggregates demand-side power to balance that of providers, such as under managed competition (Enthoven, 1978) .
Moreover, although competition is not explicitly modeled in this article, the results reinforce others' work suggesting that caution is warranted regarding competition in health insurance and healthcare markets. Competition between providers is likely to exacerbate selection incentives, especially when competition and high-powered reimbursement incentives are combined.
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RISK ADJUSTMENT
Although better agency on behalf of patients can help to prevent selection, it may also exacerbate moral hazard inefficiencies. 26 To target risk selection directly, the most 23 This assumes that the initial degree of agency is suboptimal for society (i.e., α <0). As Dr. Victor
Fuchs noted in his 1996 presidential address to the American Economics Association, "One of the greatest errors of health policy-makers today is their assumption that market competition or government regulation are the only instruments available to control healthcare. There is room for, indeed need for, a revitalization of professional norms as a third instrument of control" (Fuchs 1996: 17) . One contribution of this model is a formalization of Fuchs' insight. 24 A literal interpretation of that theory (though not proposed by its authors) would have been for policymakers not to foster development of professional ethics and to protect monopolistic power of healthcare providers (increasing their bargaining power vis-à-vis patients). 25 Ellis (1997) , for example, shows that two competing Cournot-Nash healthcare providers who are paid prospectively are likely to engage in creaming (over-provision of services to low-cost patients) and skimping (under-provision of services to high-cost patients) as well as dumping. 26 Increased agency may not help to solve the incentive dilemma if the moral-hazardexacerbating effect outweighs the distaste for risk selection (i.e., a "good agent" indulges moral hazard, which increases the cost differential between high risks and the premium based on average risk, counteracting the posited ethical distaste for dumping).
effective policy instrument is accurate risk adjustment of provider payments. By adjusting payments for endogenous risk mix, risk adjustment makes selection (partially) contractible. The model in this article can capture risk adjustment in a straightforward way. Let capitation payments be based on average risk and selection according to the following:
The parameter 0 1 ≤ ≤ β represents the accuracy of risk adjustment. If β = 0 , capitation is based on the population average risk δ , and there is no adjustment. As Proposition 2 suggests, for high population heterogeneity and low agency, the optimal payment system must actively trade off selection and moral hazard. Proposition 3 asserts that risk adjustment can improve the terms of this trade-off by mitigating selection and allowing demand-side cost sharing to be reduced. In other words, as risk adjustment technology becomes more accurate, the constraint on inefficient over-utilization can be switched from demand-side cost sharing to supply-side incentives. 28 If the improvement in risk adjustment technology dominates improvement in risk-selection technology, then society benefits from a less costly trade-off between efficient utilization and equitable insurance coverage.
RELATED LITERATURE
The direct antecedents to the present work are Ellis and McGuire (1990) on optimal payment systems and Newhouse (1996) on how the contracting costs of selection can account for pooling equilibria. Selden (1990) also analyzes payment systems of mixed capitation and reimbursement, without examining selection.
Like E&M (1990), Ma and McGuire (1997) analyze optimal contracting among consumers, providers, and payers, retaining the assumption of consumer homogeneity. They emphasize two contracting problems: that the quantity of treatment is noncontractible (so that payers must rely on reported claims) and that physician ef-27 Beta equal to one represents optimal risk adjustment. For a discussion and theoretical derivation of the difference between optimal and conventional risk adjustment, see Glazer and McGuire (forthcoming) . In the present model, with no imperfect signal of consumer risk type and no plan competition for enrollees, the distinction between conventional and optimal risk adjustment is of no significance. 28 As E&M (1990) notes, "powerful supply-side policies are what make full insurance possible for consumers" (pp. 394-395). With accurate risk adjustment, powerful supply-side incentives can be used without inducing large welfare losses from selection.
fort-an important element of quality of care-is inherently noncontractible. This article focuses on a different market failure: inefficient risk segmentation based on the noncontractibility of provider effort to select healthier patients.
Some previous models have yielded insights into selection. Ma (1994) assumes that the provider can perfectly and costlessly determine which patients will cost more than a certain amount and exclude unprofitable patients from treatment. The approach taken here differs in that selection effort is costly and imperfect, and financing provider rents causes an efficiency loss. 29 The author's model of selection is closer to that of Ellis (1997) , although his model abstracts from the issue of optimal demand-side cost sharing in the presence of selection. In addition, dumping is costless and better agency exacerbates both moral hazard and risk selection. In contrast, by recognizing that selection is costly to plan administrators because it induces disutility in providers, the author derives the more intuitive result that greater loyalty to patients can reduce risk selection.
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CONCLUSION
This article develops a simple model with risk heterogeneity among consumers and provider risk selection to illustrate the importance of taking account of selection when setting payment policy. The intuition of the model is straightforward. In the original formulation of the moral hazard problem, the level of demand-side cost sharing (patient out-of-pocket payments or co-insurance) is a single policy tool aiming at two conflicting goals: minimization of consumer risk from medical expenditures and efficient utilization of health services (control of moral hazard). This single tool can achieve only a second-best solution, balancing the goals of spreading risk and curbing moral hazard (Zeckhauser, 1970; Ellis and McGuire, 1993) . Under certain circumstances, use of a second tool, supply-side cost sharing, allows attainment of the socially preferred ("first-best") outcome for the moral hazard problem [E&M (1990) ]. However, it seems implausible that these required circumstances-low provider agency for patients and high provider bargaining power-can achieve first-best outcomes in the presence of selection. Low agency and high provider bargaining power are precisely the conditions under which the welfare losses from risk selection can be most severe.
A policy-relevant theory of optimal health insurance-provider payment systems therefore should allow for risk heterogeneity and selection behavior. In the simple model developed in this article, an optimal payment system maximizes the expected utility of a randomly chosen consumer through choice of levels of demand-and supplyside cost sharing, subject to provider reaction functions and participation constraints. Previous theoretical results emerge as the special case of risk homogeneity. With risk heterogeneity, when both moral hazard and selection are important, demand-and 29 Newhouse (1996) points out that the optimality of the piecewise linear reimbursement scheme derived by Ma (1994) depends on his assumption of no efficiency loss from financing provider rents. 30 Kwon (1997) also models payment systems with heterogeneity of patient severity, but, like Ellis (1997) , assumes that consumers are fully insured, abstracting from interaction between health insurance and provider payment contracts. Kwon also excludes any explicit model of provider risk selection.
supply-side cost sharing can no longer in general achieve the social optimum. The "second-best" optimal payment system will almost certainly involve mixed levels of both demand-and supply-side cost sharing. This result is intuitive: consumers probably prefer to pay some out-of-pocket deductibles and co-payments rather than have their healthcare providers receive large financial rewards for skimping on care or discriminating against expensive-to-treat patients. Risk adjustment of provider payments can improve the terms of the social trade-off between inefficient utilization and risk selection. Provider professional ethics can be beneficial for moderating adverse side effects of supply-side financial incentives (see Table 2 ). The model makes a number of restrictive assumptions, including simple (linear) assumptions on consumer expected utility and risk selection technology, only two consumer risk types, provider homogeneity, costless verifiability of production costs, limited regulation, and no competition. Such assumptions enable the author to reach analytically tractable answers, and their relaxation is unlikely to change the results substantially. Including greater consumer heterogeneity and provider competition, for example, almost surely will reinforce selection incentives. Moreover, the broad results that are highlighted-particularly the strengths of a mixed system of demandand supply-side cost sharing-are consistent with the empirical literature and policy trends. Potentially interesting policy insights may come from further extensions: explicitly modeling service-specific selection distortions; including other investments by providers, such as in cost reduction, quality improvement, or preventive care; considering the incentive effects of ownership structure 31 ; and exploring the political economy of payment system reform.
APPENDIX
Example of definition of selection index t . To illustrate how the selection index t can represent benefit design and service-specific quality distortions, we can draw on the shadow price framework proposed in Frank, Glazer, and McGuire (1998) . These authors model selection as a health plan discouraging unprofitable customers from enrolling by stringently rationing the services those customers value. Rationing is captured by the shadow price associated with each service. Assuming that doctors allocate a given budget to its highest valued use, the health plan manager can increase the shadow price of access to a given service by allocating a smaller budget to that service. This suggests that an index of shadow prices for various services can reveal risk selection distortions of benefit design and treatment patterns.
Formally, let the shadow price for each service i be represented by q i and the optimal shadow price be normalized to 1. A distortion index that captures the extent of service quality distortions would be It is straightforward to show that with this definition of t , t = 0 represents no service distortions and t approaching 1 represents very large deviations of shadow prices from the optimum. More strict rationing of a service increases selection t if that service is already rationed too tightly q i > ( ) 1 and decreases selection if that service is not rationed strictly enough ( q i < 1; i.e., to attract or "cream" low-risk consumers). The effect of changing one shadow price on the overall selection index will also depend on how that service is correlated with other services. This index therefore captures much of the complexity that risk selection can entail. Nevertheless, it is only one potential definition of t; the concept can be extended to include selective advertising, choice of location, etc., which have been shown in the literature to foster risk selection. With risk heterogeneity, (a) is not a sufficient condition to ensure that the first-best is attainable, since even if (a) is satisfied, risk selection may occur. Therefore, it remains to establish the condition under which no risk selection emerges in equilibrium. This second condition is given by (b), as shown below.
Recall that t * is chosen according to (11). With first-best utilization and s s = *, (11) becomes: Since the cost-of-effort function is strictly convex, ′ > > ′ = γ γ ( * ) ( * ) t t 0 0 .
Q.E.D.
Proposition 3. As risk adjustment technology improves (as β increases toward 1), selection effort decreases (dt*/d β <0) until it is deterred altogether.
Proof of Proposition 3:
With provider reimbursement a function of risk adjustment accuracy, the expected utility of the provider is given by Q.E.D.
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